![]() Theories that maintain the experience requirement are experiential theories of wellbeing. ![]() Some theories of wellbeing maintain that only what affects our experience can alter someone’s wellbeing, while other theories deny this. There is a large variety of theories on the nature of wellbeing, but one important distinction that divides them is the experience requirement. I then argue that the argument can be avoided on a pluralistic account, and formulate a plausible candidate for an account of pluralistic experientialism, in which, besides pleasure, non-hedonic aspects of experience like novelty, compassion, and aesthetic value also contribute to wellbeing. I argue that such responses deviate from the central hedonistic view that only pleasure and pain matter for wellbeing. I then analyze responses to the main argument against a monistic view on the value of experience: the philosophy of swine objection. In support of this claim, I argue first that pleasure should not be understood as a broad term to describe valuable experiences generally. The value of experience should not be understood as being limited to pleasure, and as such, the most plausible experientialist account of wellbeing is pluralistic, not hedonistic. ![]() In this article I present the claim that hedonism is not the most plausible experientialist account of wellbeing. Typically, these accounts are hedonistic. Experientialist accounts of wellbeing are those accounts of wellbeing that subscribe to the experience requirement.
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